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Is Curriculum Integration Like 
Miscegenation? 
by 
John H. Chambers 
Tasmanian College of Advanced Education 
At my last college in London, it was the practice for students to study 
one subject for general educational purposes for three years and a second 
subject for two years, this latter subject also having some connection with 
subjects taught in the schools. One day at a staff meeting the deputy 
principal argued that some secondary schools in London were already 
engaged in inter-disciplinary and 'integrated' studies, that our college 
should not only be preparing students for the actual world of schools 
but should be leading in new ideas, and that therefore the college should 
be teaching 'integrated' material to its students. His suggestion was that 
one of the two-year subjects we offered should be of an 'integrated' 
nature; to be called European Studies, it would enable us to draw upon 
the discipline-knowledge and the staff that the college already possessed. 
The historians could teach European history, the philosophers European 
philosophy, the literature lecturers European literature, the geographers 
European geography, the artists European art, and so on and so on. We 
would, he thought, be getting the best of all possible worlds. His 
suggestion was enthusiastically received and duly got underway despite the 
reservations expressed from certain quarters. There were four-week units 
on European history, ELiropean literature, European art .... At term's 
end there were distinct rumblings of discontent from the students, and 
the staff involved were having misgivings. Prior to a meeting to review 
the progress of the course, I asked some of the students about their 
feelings and received answers of the sort, "We get a bite of the cherry 
and they take it from our mouths", "The work is too superficial" ,"What's 
the real point of the course?" In truth, there was a great deal of discontent 
and muddle and in the middle of the muddle the deputy left for a position 
at one of Britain's ancient universities, while the staff struggled to give 
life to his premature infant. 
The moral of the story is, I suppose, that an important idea is liable 
to be ruined by superficial understanding and misdirected enthusiasm. 
After all, what was being 'integrated' in that Europea~ Studies course? 
Was there inter-disciplinary (I-D for short) study gomg on? In what 
sense was the study inter-disciplinary? Is 'Europe' a unifying concept 
that has its meaning and significance written on its face? What was 
there in comrrlOn among the different parts of the course? In what 
epistemologically-useful way is a continent by itself a unifying feature 
that provides meaning? The fault with this particular European Studies 
course was that it was never made clear either what was being 'integrated' 
or brought together in an I-D way with what possible results, or what 
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was the educational point of it all. Had such issues been examined I 
assume that the course would have been approached in a rather differ;nt 
way. 
In this article I want to ask and to try to answer the question, 'In the 
organization of the school curriculum, what do the words 'integration' 
and 'inter-disciplinary' mean?' and to examine certain fundamental 
epistemological issues in doing so. My answer will be quite tentative and 
sketchy; I see it as merely the sort of initial move that must be made if 
this very important area of curriculum concern is to be even superficially 
understood. There may well be some even more epistemologically-
fundamental answers that also need to be sought, but what I', have to say 
is, I believe, pointing at least in the right direction. !. 
Let me emphasize that I am talking about curriculum integration in the 
school, i.e. about the content of courses, about the variety of learning 
planned for children to acquire in the schools, not about methods used in 
teaching or learning the content. (I'm not suggesting that the methods 
used have no effect on the learning acquired. Of course there is an effect. 
But if we are to be quite clear about what ought to go on in schools then 
we must be fully aware of the conceptual distinction between the learning 
that is to be acquired i.e. the curriculum, and the methods by which that 
learning is brought about.) Nothing at all about so-called traditional or 
progressive methods of teaching follows from what I say here. I n this 
sense of curriculum, traditional and progressive methods are equally 
possible with any sort of curriculum. And connections between methods 
and content will be logically contingent. Neither am I talking about some 
kind of integrated problem-solving approach to working at the content of 
the curriculum on the lines for instance of John Dewey's omnicompetent 
model (Dewey, 1938). Furthermore, I am not talking about the time 
organization of the school day. The term, 'integrated day' is sometimes 
used to describe a flexibility of time organization, but I am not discussing 
that here; so-called integrated days are equally possible with any sort of 
curriculum. And I am not talking about the integrated understanding that 
a chiid may acquire as a result of studying the various types of knowledge 
that feature on a curriculum. 
The term, 'I-D', despite its obvious complexity has some meaning. 
I understand it as bringing together different disciplines (see next paragraph) 
to focus on a topic of interest or to help solve a problem. In the I-D parts 
of a curriculum various disciplines will be used to try to solve a problem 
or to throw light upon a topic of interest. An I-D problem will be a 
problem that requires an answer in the world of practical application, and 
that requires more than one discipline to be brought to bear to solve it; 
an I-D topic will be a topic of some intrinsic interest that requires more 
than one discipline to understand it. Typical I-D problems will be town 
planning, bridge building, educating children - indeed in educating 
children there will be an unlimited number of problems whose solution 
can only be achieved (to the extent that they can) through an I-D 
app~oach. Typical I-D topics would include pollution, poverty, the 
environment and war. 
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By the term 'discipline' I mean a well-established, relatively discrete 
subject with a recognizable conceptual scheme, a particular pattern of 
enquiry and an accepted name. It is probably best to define a discipline 
denotatively, by suggesting that history, literature, botany, psychology, 
philosophy (or a sub-division of these, e.g. British history, Australian 
literature, marine botany, Freudian psychology, philosophy of mind) 
as studied in CAEs and universities are disciplines. A discipline will usually 
be a branch of a form of knowledge (see below), but may also in a 
complex way draw upon more than one form of knowledge. The ways in 
which the concepts 'subject', 'discipline' and 'form of knowledge' are 
inter-related is of course itself an interesting question into which it is not 
possible to look in this article, except to say that the word 'subject' may 
be merely a useful and general name for any area of the curriculum 
bounded for the purpose of convenient study, and that subjects that 
feature on school curricula mayor may not be disciplines in the above 
sense and are usually not co-extensive with a form of knowledge as 
described below; for instance, the subject mathematics, as usually taught 
in a school, may involve aspects of historical or scientific study. It is not 
merely a mathematical study in either a discipline sense or form- of-
knowledge sense. It will be seen that I am in no way suggesting that a 
discipline is a logically-fundamental division of knowledge. Nevertheless 
it is clear that we do have paradigms of disciplines, for example, botany 
or history as studied in CAEs and universities, and it is these paradigms 
that will provide the meaning for the word, 'discipline' as used in the term, 
'I-D' in this article. 
In I-D work, the nature of the claims and statements from the 
disciplines will remain the same in the suggested solution to the problem 
or in the attainment of understanding of a topic, so that an analysis of 
any conclusions reached or points of view held after an I-D study will 
show various disciplinary facts and assertions meshed or woven in some 
way, but still retaining their original character. For instance, the finished 
town plan will be a complex mixture of statistics, economic claims, 
artistic value judgements, moralizing at various levels of sophistication, 
claims about historic worth of buildings, scientific statements of a 
physical, botanical, biological, geological sort, and so on. The recent 
report on post-secondary education in Tasmania (Karmel, 1976) was an 
I-D study, consisting of claims about educational worth, economic 
assessments, assumptions and generalizations, statistical tables of 
population distribution and growth, statistical projections, sociological 
evidence, hypotheses and arguments, and psychological assumptions. 
(I assume that statements about educational worth are themselves mixed 
and I-D, being complex meshes of philosophical, psychological, moral, 
sociological etc. considerations; so we have I-D work in at least two 
levels in education reports, which is just one cause of their contentious 
and equivocal nature). If the Karmel report were set for study as part 
of a curriculum, what would be encountered by a student would be 
various sociological/historical facts, economic generalizations, and so on. 
For instance a student may claim to have learned that between 1966 and 
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1971 Tasmania experienced a net migration which was most pronounced 
in the fifteen to twenty-four year age group (Karmel, 3.10), and that 
small tertiary institutions are expensive to run (Karmel, 6.1). i.e. the 
student would have learned many things, but things generally locatable 
within disciplines. I-Dworkand curriculum then, is complex and difficult, 
but at least something of the conceptual basis and structure contributed 
by the various disciplines can be understood. And to the extent that we 
can understand the contributory disciplines, to that extent we have some 
possibility of understanding an I-D approach. To the extent that we can 
understand such things as the economic assessments and assumptions the 
education value judgments, the statistical projections in ,the Ka~mel 
Report on Tasmanian tertiary education, to that extent can we follow 
the evidence and understand the recommendations. The logic of the 
connections between the evidence and the recommendations may of 
course be a further matter but I cannot discuss that here. 
Can the same sort of claim just made for I-D work be made for 
integration? 
It certainly sounds as though whatever it is that is 'integrated' is more 
permanently mixed or meshed than whatever is achieved in an I-D fashion. 
But what is being 'integrated' in a so-called 'integrated study' or 
'integrated curriculum'? I can understand what things are being integrated 
when mathematicians use integration in the calculus; many small move-
ments become a large movement, many infinitesimal changes in position 
become a curve, and so on. I can understand what has gone on before a 
bomb dis-integrates; a steel casing is made to surround a set of chemicals 
of a potentially explosive combination. I can understand what is meant 
by racial integration; South Africa's Cape coloureds provide a good instance. 
There, miscegenation between slaves, Hottentots, early white inhabitants 
of the Cape, and sailors on the town in Capetown has produced a unique 
racial mixture, or has achieved racial integration. The opposite of racial 
integration is presumably South Africa's present Apartheid policy where 
races are segregated rather than integrated. 
In these sorts of contexts I can understand what is meant by the 
word, 'integration', and what things are being integrated. I can also under-
stand something about the resulting product; a curve, a bomb, a new 
racial type. But just what. is to be made of the suggestions about 
curriculum 'integration'? Equivalent to the small movements the 
infinitesimal changes, the steel and chemicals, the different racial types, 
there will be various pieces of knowledge drawn from the various dis-
ciplines such as botany or history. But in place of the large movement, 
the curve, the bomb, the new racial type, what is there supposed to be? 
A new knowledge acquired, a new unity of learning, a new discipline? 
In short, What is the epistemological thesis underlying talk about 
curriculum integration? Can we, logically can we, provide children with 
new sorts of knowledge and understanding through doing something 
called 'integration' in the curriculum? Or do we in fact have precisely 
the same sort of result as we have when we approach the school's 
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curriculum problems and topics in what we say is an I-D curriculum? 
Do we in short have in schools the acquisition of the same learning and 
end-products as we have with I-D work or curriculum, but we give it a 
new and fancier name 'integration' or 'integrated curriculum'? Here it 
may be important to ~ote that I am referring only to what goes on in 
schools under the name, 'integration'. I am not referring to curriculum 
pursuits and learning acquired in the more rarefied reaches of academic 
work where something that perhaps may sensibly be called 'inlegration' 
is occurring, where new subjects with a fair degree of rigour may be 
emerging. For instance, environmental science, which attempts to describe 
the laws governing the interaction of the biological and the physical 
environments and which deals with the contact area between biology 
and chemistry, perhaps appropriately may be called an integrated study. 
Therefore that part of the curriculum of a college in which it occurs may 
be called an integrated curriculum. But I think it is manifest that this 
is not the sort of thing that goes on in schools: the subject that goes under 
that name in schools being merely a mesh of separate scientific disciplines 
(see below). 
Perhaps the issues can be made a little clearer through an examination 
of the nature of knowledge types. This is a vast project so a quick analysis 
or resume will be liable to indulge in over-simplification and misinterpret-
ation. Nevertheless, I think that some brief examination of the nature of 
knowledge types is necessary if there is to be even a minimal understanding 
of the concepts of 'I-D' and 'integration' in the school curriculum. 
Probably the two best known and most widely canvassed epistemological 
schemes in school curriculum theory are those of Phenix (1964) and Hirst 
(1965, 1966, 1970, 1974). There seem to me to be certain logical flaws 
in Phenix's analysis which rule it out (see Hirst, 1974, 57), and in what 
follows I shall be assuming that Hirst's approach is approximately on the 
right lines. 
Hirst's thesis can be put quite succinctly in the claim that all human 
knowledge and understanding can on analysis be reduced to a number of 
discrete and mutually-irreducible types, distinguishable on the basis of 
concepts unique to them and of tests for the truth of propositions within 
them. Hirst nominates seven such basic forms (basic in the sense that they 
are what our conceptual understanding makes clear now, not basic in the 
sense that there can never be further forms evolved). They are pure 
mathematics and logic, science, knowledge of minds, moral knowledge, 
aesthetic knowledge, religion, philosophy. What appear to be further 
sorts of knowledge will then be, according to Hirst, complex mixtures 
of these fundamental types, and all human knowledge and understanding 
will necessarily presuppose such basic types, as will all human enquiry 
that goes in search of knowledge and understanding. 
Hirst is not referring only to organised or disciplined knowledge; the 
thesis applies to knowledge of everyday affairs and commonsense 
knowledge. After all, any item of knowledge, whatever its level of sophist-
ication or abstraction, must involve a conceptual structure of some sort 
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and it will be this conceptual structure and the truth criterion for making 
claims about it that give it its special quality. Everyday and common-
sense knowledge will therefore also have the features Hirst indicates. It is 
just because we accept commonsense knowledge so easily and without 
question that makes it seem different in type from the knowledge con-
tained in Hirst's seemingly more abstruse and academic forms. But the 
taking of commonsense knowledge for granted does not make it any 
different; nor does its unorganised appearance, since any particular aspect 
or proposition will still lie within a form. Quite esoteric and abstruse 
claims of science can become as though they were commonsense for the 
researcher at the fringes of his discipline, and can be taken just as much 
for granted by him as things assumed true by the first year infant school 
child. Five year old Johnny may say that the red stone is hard and the 
white rubber is soft, while Professor Herbert Dingle (1972) may argue 
that Einstein 'got some of his sums wrong' in the theory of special 
relativity, but they are both making claims about the empirical world and 
to that extent they are in the realms of natural science. A distinguished 
philosopher of science has put the connection between everyday 
knowledge and disciplined knowledge in this way: HA study of the 
working of science must begin with a study of the language of description 
and explanation. We must begin with the logically simplest kinds of 
descriptions and explanations - those we formu late in everyday language 
to deal with everyday situations. H(Harre, 1960, p.7.) Similar claims 
about a continuum between everyday knowledge and more sophisticated 
knowledge can be made with respect to the knowledge of the other 
forms. In view of the usual claim that infants' teachers are not concerned 
with the disciplines, it is revealing to look at what goes on in an infant 
school class in these terms: when they are manipulating Dienes rods 
children are working within the form, mathematics; when watching a 
plant grow from a seed in wet cottonwool, or when engaging in sand and 
water play they are beginning to develop scientific understanding; when 
watching a friend at play to try to decide his intentions, or when making a 
decision of his own, a child is beginning to have knowledge of minds; 
when learning to take turns, children are in the moral realm; when they 
act out a nursery rhyme or paint a poster colour picture they are squarely 
within the aesthetic area; and when they say a prayer at morning assembly 
they are engaging in at least some sort of religious exercise. The children 
themselves will not make such distinctions explicit of course, and perhaps 
neither will the teachers. Nevertheless the children will be working within 
these forms of knowledge. 
Hirst's analysis, while doubtlessly questionable as to some details, 
makes a good case for the existence of a number of irreducibly distinct 
forms of knowledge, and the disciplines as usually understood such as 
botany and history, will be either branches of a form (botany is a branch 
of science) or else complex mixes of two or more forms (history is a mix 
of knowledge of minds and of science, as outlined below). By saying, 
'questionable as to some details', I mean that we can ask questions about 
the nature of the truth criterion for our knowledge of minds, and about 
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whether works of art make artistic statements that are analogous, say, to 
scientific statements. I do not mean that the thesis can be questioned in 
the way some writers in the sociology of knowledge have somewhat 
simplistically questioned it by saying that all knowledge is culture-relative. 
Learning in an 1-0 curriculum brings these disciplines to a focus on a 
problem or topic of interest. H irst's analysis has been outlined in an 
attempt to answer the question, "Do we in short have in scho01s the same 
learning from the same sort of curriculum as with 1-0 work, but we give 
it the new and fancier name, 'integration'?" Now if the term, 'integration' 
in 'integrated studies' or 'integrated curriculum' had a meaning in a school 
curriculum distinct from the meaning that can be attached to the term, 
'1-0', such meaning would have to attach to the new unity of the learning 
that was to be derived or achieved. This new unity would be analogous to 
the new unity produced from disparate racial types through miscegenation, 
or to the unified curve that integration produces from small movements 
in the calculus. I suggest that'there is no such analogy in the curriculum of 
the school student. Of course it is not fundamentally important whether 
we use one name or two for the learning that is acquired in an 1-0 curric-
ulum. What is important is that we should be aware of the epistemological 
foundations of the things we teach in schools, so that we can have a proper 
basis for decisions we make about what learning should feature in a school's 
curriculum. But names can lead us astray in our expectations and in our 
beliefs about the foundations, and more importantly perhaps, in our 
beliefs about the possible curriculum arrangements that we can make. 
I suggest that the term, 'integration' leads us astray in just these ways. 
This is why I want to use only the term, '1-0' and to drop the term 
'integration' from school curriculum discussions, with perhaps the possible 
exception of a special usesuggested below. 
Hirst's thesis has further important implications for the curriculum, 
that must be discussed at this point. A number of advocates of curriculum 
integration believe that any curriculum organization is as acceptable as any 
other, but Hirst's thesis would seem to give the lie to such a claim. His 
thesis indicates that it is not possible to reconstruct the curriculum just as 
anyone likes because the nature of the fundamentals of the knowledge 
that is to be 'acquired are in a sense, given, and cannot be disregarded if we 
are to be concerned with the acquisition of know/edge rather than with 
indulgence in fancy or irrationality. "All knowledge occurs within some 
logical structure which is what it is. There simply is no such thing as 
knowledge which is not locatable within some such organisation. "(Hirst, 
1974, p.135). The term 'knowledge' in the present discussion is akin to 
'justified true belief', knowledge being connected with objectivity, truth 
and reason. For example, someone possesses knowledge when he says 
that the earth is spherical. He knows that the earth is spherical and we 
can all agree that he is in possession of knowledge, not because any 
particular person has said so, but because it is so, because it can be shown 
so by a myriad of mutually-supporting experiments tied to the world of 
experience. The 'flat-earthers' just are wrong. Their flat-earth thesis c~~ be 
sustained only through the introduction of the most preposterous auxIliary 
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hypotheses such as, 'the higher our altitude, the stronger our eyesight'; 
hypotheses that can quickly be shown, to anyone interested in truth, 
objectivity and reason, to be false. I introduced this example of knowledge 
because I said that it is not possible to reconstruct the curriculum just as 
we like, if we are in fact concerned with knowledge. The fact that the 
earth is spherical is not an isolated fact, but one that interrelates with a 
host of other empirical truths that fall within the fundamental form, 
science. Thus to know that the earth is spherical is to know something that 
is fundamental to a rational understanding of one's place in the universe. 
And in Hirst's analysis all knowledge is so traceable to its place within 
one of the fundamental forms. 
I, 
We have several fundamental forms because, in order to deal with the 
real world, conceptual structures have had to be separated out alongside 
the truth tests that both support the structure and help inform the 
structure. When we re-organize the curriculum ~ if we are indeed concerned 
with knowledge, we merely reorganize the ways in which the fundamental 
structures are acquired; we delude ourselves if we believe otherwise. And 
I take it that we must be concerned with knowledge because knowledge 
is so fundamental in human activity; knowledge is essential for a properly-
grounded understanding of our situation in the world, but not just any 
sort of knowledge: knowledge rather of the fundamental types that 
structure our understanding and upon which we necessarily draw day by 
day. After all, even the affective areas of human endeavour have their 
knowledge core. So an attack on the structure of the curriculum may be 
completely acceptable, but will have certain epistemological limits. An 
attack on the knowledge foundations that underpin any curriculum will 
be misplaced. Some curriculum theorists have mistakenly thought that 
the first is possible only by way of the second (Hirst, 1974, p.139). 
None of the 'integrated' approaches to the school curriculum has 
achieved a new unity of knowledge. All they appear to have produced 
is a new mesh or aggregation drawn ultimately from various branches 
of the different forms of knowledge, new meshes or aggregations that 
are certainly 1-0, but only I-D. Advocates of 'integration' see these 
same meshes or aggregations as 'integration' only because they have 
not exam ined the epistemological presuppositions of their position 
sufficiently - what it would be for knowledge to be integrated. 
Of f:Ourse I am not suggesting that one form of knowledge never 
makes use of another form. Of course it does. Indeed one form may be 
logically necessary for progress in another form. But to be logically 
necessary is not to be logically sufficient. It may be that no serious progress 
in physical science could have occurred without an appropriate develop-
ment in mathematics, but that does not mean that scientific knowledge 
and understanding is reducible to mathematics. Phenix makes this point 
when he writes that the 
... decisive difference is that in empirical science the deductions must 
finally be checked against observations. In mathematics the only 
requirement is internal consistency within any given theory. In empirical 
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science the chain of propositions must also be consistent with the 
results of actual physical measurements. (1964, p.1 02). 
For instance the physicist may 'idealize' a mechanical problem by putting 
it into purely mathematical terms. The 'idealized' problem can then 
yield a solution. But the solution must then be verified by experim.ents in 
physics. Again, it may well be that we cannot draw moral conclusions or 
make moral judgments without reference to various scientific facts about 
the world but this does not turn our moral judgment into a scientific 
one. Thes~ kinds of interrelationships between our knowledge of different 
forms are manifest and multitudinous, but they are not evidence for any 
supposed 'integrationist' thesis about the school curriculum. The concept-
ual scheme and the truth criteria are peculiar to the one form of 
knowledge alone, whatever use we may make of knowledge drawn from 
the other forms. 
Having outlined Hirst's thesis, it will be clear that such a subject .as 
environmental science, mentioned earlier, while no doubt new, and while 
providing something of a new unity, is still within the overall form of 
science. It does not overlap forms of knowledge. It may well be that such 
new areas are necessary if we are to continue to have developments in our 
knowledge - progress would clearly seem to be possible at the interfaces 
between branches of a form. Thus new subjects may be breaking down the 
distinctions between subjects and diciplines, but they are not breaking 
down the distinctions between forms; we are getting new sub-forms, not 
new forms or 'integrations' across forms. And what is apposite to the 
present article is that none of this applies to the work done in a school 
curriculum. 
If the use of the term 'integration' were to mean the use of scientific 
facts to make moral judgements, the use of mathematical tools .in drawing 
scientific conclusions, and so on, then there would be a meanmg.for the 
term 'integration', but equally there would be nothing new, nothmg that 
we have not had in the most 'traditional', 'conservative', 'subject-centred' 
curriculum. In other words when meaningfully used, the term would not 
be doing the sort of work it was presumably introduced by curriculum 
theorists to do. Furthermore it would be confusing since it could then 
be claimed that the same sch~oi curriculum was both subject-centred and 
'integrated" . 
There is perhaps a way' in which the term, 'integration' can be given 
another quite meaningful use at the level of school curriculum talk. 
It might be suggested that it be used when reference is being made to some 
of those studies that are already well-established in schools but which are 
not as logically-basic as Hirst's seven forms of knowledge or the 
subdivisions within these forms, and which were referred to above as 
"well-established and 1-0". Hirst calls these sort of studies fields of 
knowledge and practical theories of knowledge (Hirst, 1965, 1966). 
Fields of knowledge are grouped around some common interest or topic, 
while practical theories of knowledge have the additional unifying purpose 
of a practical concern. 'Our Neighbourhood', 'Modern European Man', 
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'Pollution', geography and history are fields; medicine, home economics 
and educational theory are practical theories. My suggestion is that we 
perhaps call the well-established fields such as history and geography, 
'integrated studies' rather than just 1-0 studies. Such subjects have a 
long tradition of maintained study, well-established disciplinary names, 
and the man in the street has some notion of what they are, but they 
are different in logical type from forms or divisions of forms; they are 
not as logically-basic. The term, 'integration' may be appropriate in their 
case because they are meaningful wholes unified around the 'method-
ological' concepts of time and space: of happening through time and of 
organization across space. This is not to say that history and: geography 
are logical wholes in the way that a form of knowledge or a branch of a 
form is a logical whole. It is to say that the 'methodological' foundations 
connected with the development over time and organization through 
space bring together the more fundamental material deriving from the 
forms of knowledge, and of which history and geography consist, into a 
meaningful 'psychological' whole or unity. 
That a study such as history can perhaps be regarded meaningfully 
as an integrated study because a 'psychological' whole, can be shown 
by briefly analyzing its features. History studies historical events. 
Historical events take place across periods of time. Historical events 
include the Battle of Actium, life on the Ballarat goldfields, Mohammad's 
Hegira, Galileo's scientific experiments, World War I. Broad or narrow, 
these are historical events to be explained in an historical way. Historians 
describe, explain, interpret and relate events one to another, attempting 
to see them as wholes and to outline the circumstances and causes 
surrounding, and the reasons for actions taken by human beings in the 
past. In history, the individual pieces are important for their own sake 
as objects of knowledge also. The historian is distinguished from other 
scholars not only because he is interested in happenings through time, 
but also because of the emphasis he places upon the role of individual 
motives, actions, accomplishments, failures and contingencies. It is these 
that give historical events their 'inside'. It is these that make history 
different from a mere empirical or scientific study and give it the 
dimension that in Hirst's terms lies within the form, knowledge of minds. 
Historians, whenever it is appropriate, give explanations in terms of 
motives and reasons, not just of causes. In history it is often appropriate 
to ask why certain people acted as they did and to answer at a level 
different from that at which the phenomena of rocks and animals are 
explained. We understand what it is to have purposes of our own, what it 
is to strive, what it is to be a human being, but with rocks and animals 
it cannot be claimed that there are inner workings that are understandable. 
The second dimension to history is of course the scientific one. While it 
is true that historians describe past events and in that sense there isn't 
anything 'there' in the way the scientist's material is (usually) there, there 
is no difference in principle between this aspect of the historian's work 
and the work of scientists. Certainly the historian deals with the past but 
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the past is not an epistemologically-fundamental category. It has to be 
interpreted from the evidence which remains, but to the extent that it has 
left evidence that is accessible, the past is accessible in the way that the 
present is accessible to the scientist. The historian, like the scie~tist h~s an 
hypothesis in mind. When this requ ires more than reference to intentions, 
decisions and beliefs of individuals, he can get the help of archaeology, 
numismatics, palaeography, sigillography, chemistry and so on, through 
both their procedures and their established laws and theories, to draw their 
historical conclusions. In brief, the argument is that history is a complex 
inter-relationship of the more logically-fundamental forms, knowledge of 
minds and science. The historian's final output of article or book is a 
largely ordinary - language kind of description and explanation using 
these more basic forms of knowledge. But because of the given 'method-
ological' background of connection and development through time, there 
is no forced joining of these contributory forms. 
This is why I think it can be suggested that the term, 'integration' 
perhaps can be appropriately applied to a subject such as history at the 
school curriculum level. It seems that a similar case for calling geography 
at the school level an integrated study can be made, and perhaps a case 
for some of the other well-established fields of knowledge that have 
traditionally featured as school subjects. However I do not think that such 
a case can be constructed for such curriculum groupings as "Our 
Neighbourhood", or "Modern European Man". Stud ies such as these are 
fields in Hirst's sense, but lack the 'psychological' and 'methodological' 
unity provided in history and geography by connections across time and 
space, which give the term 'integration' some meaning. Th~y are I-D 
studies consisting of propositions, claims, arguments, assumptions of the 
sort earlier suggested as characterizing town plans or educational reports. 
They will themselves involve the more integrated statements and 
arguments of history and geography. 
Although I have rejected as redundant or misapplied, the usual use of 
the term, 'integration', it is important that I emphasize that I ~m in no 
way opposed to properly-directed I-D studies. Indeed, I believe that 
certain I-D work in the school curriculum (as in moral and sex education) 
is of extreme importance. But a superficial understanding of the epistemol-
ogy, a misdirected enthusiasm and a glib use of the term, 'integra~ion' may 
do more harm than good to the important cause of I-D studies In schools 
- the sort of harm indicated in the example of European studies at my 
last college, mentioned at the beginning of this article. For unlike the 
issues with which, say, the Karmel Report in Tasmania had to deal, issues 
which could only be approached in an I-D way, the EUropean studies 
course had no problem to solve, no issues to decide, not even an organizing 
focus or real centre of interest. Its reason for existence was the worst of 
all educational reasons - educational fashion. 
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